The Vichy of the `Total war'
Vichy 1942-44: Laval and Germany's Total War
Pierre Laval was a key figure in Vichy between 1940 and 1944. In April
1942 Laval was made Head of Government, a newly-created post, and from
that point on became a more influential figure within the Vichy régime.
He was particularly important however, between 1942 and 1944, the years
during which Vichy became more authoritarian and repressive. Vichy took
this direction, not through any prompting from Laval, but, rather, in
response to increasing pressure from Nazi Germany. Germany's supply of
labour from Poland and the Soviet Union was drying up and their `war
against the Jews', to use Lucy Dawidowicz's phrase, was entering a
fanatical new phase. Moreover, the war was starting to go badly for the
Nazis: the Soviet Union was beginning to gain the upper hand in the east
and the Allies were beginning to make advances in north Africa and
southern Europe. This is the context in which Pierre Laval became a
decisive influence in the Vichy régime.
By early 1942 there were concerns that Germany's supply of foreign labour
- mainly from Russia and Poland - was beginning to run out. Fritz Sauckel,
a long-time Nazi was given responsibility for recruiting new labour and,
in May 1942 he demanded that 250,000 French workers be sent to Germany by
the end of July that year. Laval, initially unhappy with this decision,
responded with a scheme called la relève by which one French
prisoner of war would be returned to France for every three workers who
volunteered to work in Germany. This scheme, perhaps inevitably, failed to
recruit the required number and by February 1943 the Vichy administration
was required to introduce a form of conscription to work in Germany. The
response in France to te introduction of compulsory labour in Germany was
increased numbers of young men fleeing, often joining the resistance
movement. At the end of the war, it is extimate that approximately 650,000
Frenchmen and 44,000 Frenchwomen had been sent to labour in Germany,
making France the second largest contributor of unskilled labour - only
Poland contributed higher numbers - and the largest contributor of skilled
labour to the German economy (Atkins: 1998 p.174).
Worse was to come. Shortly after the Wannsee conference of January 1942 in
which the details of the `final solution to the Jewish question' were
discussed, the Nazi authorities began to request the arrest and
deportation of Jews resident on French soil. From 7 June 1942 all Jews
were required to wear a yellow star of David on their outer garments. On
the 11 June, the Nazis requested the Vichy authorities hand over 100,000
Jews for deportation. Finally, on the 23 June it informed Vichy that all
Jews were to be removed from France.
Laval's response, as was so often the case, was to attempt to bargain with
the Nazis. He offered to hand over 10,000 Jews from the Unoccupied zone in
exchange for protecting Jews of French nationality. Only if there was a
shortfall, would these French nationals from the Occupied zone be handed
over. Laval did not act out of altruism but, rather, as later historians
have argued, to preserve Vichy's autonomy and authority over French
nationals. It was thus out of a desire to safeguard the independance of
Vichy that the French police became involved in the mass arrest and
deportation of thousands of Jews resident on French soil. These mass
arrests took place all over the Occupied zone and those arrested were held
in transit camps - many historians now consider them to be antichambres
de la mort - like Pithiviers, Beaune-la-Rolande and, most famous of
all, Drancy.
The most infamous of the mass arrests was the so-called grande rafle du
Vél' d'Hiv' which took place in Paris on the 16th and 17th July 1942.
The Vélodrome d'Hiver was a large indoor sports arena situated on the rue
Nélaton near the Quai de Grenelle in the 15th arrondissment of Paris. In a
vast operation codenamed vent printanier, the French police rounded
up 12,884 Jews from Paris and its surrounding suburbs. These were mostly
adult men and women but there were 4,000 children amongst them. The
rounding up was made easier by the large number of files on Jews complied
and held by Vichy authorities since 1940. The French police, headed by
René Bousquet, were entirely resonsible for this operation and not one
German soldier assisted.
Although, in theory at least, the Vichy régime governed both Occupied and
Unoccupied zones, it constantly found the limits of its sovereignty tested
by the German military authorities who had the power of veto over any
measure or legislation to which they objected. Between June 1940 and
November 1942, the only zone over which Vichy enjoyed any real sovereignty
was the Unoccupied zone in the south. By 11 November 1942, however, this
too had been occupied. The fiction of Vichy sovereignty was exposed.
Developments in the global conflict, in particular, the military advances
of the Allied forces in north Africa - on 7 November 1942 Allied troops
landed in Morocco and Algeria as part of Operation Torch - posed the
threat of an an Allied invasion from the Mediterranean. Nazi Germany's
response to this threat was to occupy the Unoccupied zone in the south.
Total German occupation of France, the deportation of thousands of Jews
and the stepping up of German demands for French workers created massive
discontent. As dissatisfaction amongst the French population began to
increase, so too did the resistance. Moreover, with the chances of an
Allied victory looking better every day, Vichy began to lose much of its
attraction to many French. Resistance, a relatively minor phenomenon
before 1942, began a major problem for Vichy.
The growth of internal resistance made a firm response from either the
Nazis or Vichy inevitable. Since 1942 Laval had argued for the creation of
a special police force controlled by Vichy to combat internal dissent.
Initially suspicious of a rival group to the SS, the demands of the war on
the German military made Laval's proposals seem good sense. On the 5
January, the Nazi authorities allowed the Milice to be founded. At its
head was Joseph Darnand, a World War I veteran with a history of
involvement in a number of extreme Right-wing movements L'Action
française, La Croix de feu, the Cagoule and the PPF. He
supported Pétain in the early days but was also notoriously pro-Nazi. Like
Laval but more extreme, he saw the Nazis as the best defence against
Bolshevism in Europe. In October 1943, he went so far as to swear an oath
of loyalty to Hitler and became an SS Obersturmfuhrer.
The Milice recruited around 30,000 members, mostly young working-class men
from a variety of backgrounds. Some were ideologically motivated, others
were in it for the money and status, and others for the excitement of a
good scrap. Their principal aim was to track down Jews, Communists and
réfractaires (i.e. those fleeing work service in Germany) and to
combat the resistance. Their brutality was another important factor in
turning public opinion away from Vichy and towards the resistance.
Although reliable statistics are hard to come by, there is much evidence
to suggest that, in the beginning at least, Vichy enjoyed widespread
popularity. This was largely, although not exclusively, due to the
character of Pétain. Pétain and the Vichy régime enjoyed a relatively high
level of popularity in the fisrt few months. This can be partly explained
by the state of shock and disarray that many French people experienced in
the immediate aftermath of military defeat.
Making much of his own simple, rural roots, Pétain enjoyed particular
appeal in the countryside. Pétain was more popular in the rural south
because his appeal to a rural ideal found a more receptive base there. He
was no city slicker contributing to France's decadence, but a simple man
of simple tastes.
He was less popular in the north, characterized by a higher level of
industrialization and urbanization. He enjoyed little support in the
annexed zone where it was impossible to present him as a saviour. However,
he was especially popular with ex-servicemen who recalled his
compassionate treatement of the troops during World War I.
The wealthy, propertied-classes supported him for his return to a stable
order and old certainties that they perceived to be upset by the Popular
Front. There was no talk of class conflict, just a reassuring appeal to
the French to sublimate former class antagonisms to the greater good of
the nation.
He also appealed to Catholics and, especially the episciopate, for his
defence of `traditional' values and his antipathy to secular
republicanism. The Church was happy to see Pétain leading France back on
to what they saw as the right track. They hoped to see the decline of
secular values in education - very much part a trend of the Third Republic
which sought to separate Church and State - and a reaffirmation of the
Church's role in the moral life of the nation.
Vichy propaganda was quick to exploit the symbolic potential of France's
new saviour. One recurrent theme in many of the posters, advertisements,
speeches, books and songs that appeared during the Occupation, was the
notion of Pétain as the `father' of the French nation. Behind the figure
of the father is, of course, the figure of God and much propaganda played
on the quasi-divine nature of Pétain's intervention. A particularly
extreme manifestation of the `Pétain as God' analogy came from Georges
Gérard who re-wrote the Lord's prayer in his honour. Thus a kind of cult
or mystique of le maréchal was created.
Interestingly, little propaganda played on the precise details of Pétain's
distinguished military record for fear of underlining his age - he was
born in 1856 and was 84 in 1940 - and stressed instead his robust
appearance: his bright blue eyes (integrity), his snowy-white hair
(purity) and kindly grandpaternal smile (trustworthy). This said, however,
Pétain himself strongly believed in the centrality of the army to the
French nation and all propaganda images feature him in uniform.
Vichy, like other fascist régimes throughout Europe, had at its head a
charismatic leader, a man of destiny whose appearance, public statements
and characteristics were fully exploited for propaganda purposes. At the
peak of the Vichy régime, hundreds of thousands of posters and busts were
produced, his profile appeared on postage stamps, and songs were written
proclaiming the nation's support for him. The vocabulary used was
frequently religious: Pétain was the gift of God or, indeed, himself a
God- like figure. Even the Lord's Prayer was re-written in his honour.
What should be careful not to argue that propaganda alone led to the mass
appeal of Pétain as evidence suggest that there was a real groundswell of
popular support for Pétain well before the propaganda machine was set in
motion. Public disenchantment with the politicians they perceived had
brought France to disaster. The disorientating rapidity of defeat, the
confusion and suffering of the exodus.
Yves Durand (Durand: 1989 p.70-1) has written of what he calls `active'
and `passive' support for Pétain: the former being a more deep-seated
ideological support for Pétain and the ideals of the National Revolution,
and the latter being a more temporary and pragmatic acceptance that his
personal leadership was the least worst option.
After 1942, as we have seen, anti-semitic legislation, deportation and
rafles alienated many of Vichy's former supporters. By the end of a
war Pétain's reputation was in tatters, and a new saviour had emerged.
Support for Vichy
Further Reading