Introduction
These lecture notes are about the Vichy régime that governed France, in
name at least, between 1940 and 1944. They are also, of course, about
Maréchal Philippe Pétain, the man primarily associated with Vichy and its
policies. However, in spite of Vichy's emphasis on a charismatic leader,
and the virtually limitless powers accorded Pétain, Vichy was not the
creation of Pétain alone. These notes will therefore also consider the
contribution made by his ever-changing entourage of ministers and
advisors. As the course of the war changed, so too did the direction taken
by Vichy, and these notes will consider the evolution of Vichy from an
essentially conservative régime (Vichy of the National Revolution: 1940-42
- discussed in this lecture) to a more repressive and, ultimately, openly
fascist one (Vichy of the `total war': 1942-44 - to be discussed in a
later lecture).
With the armistice recently signed, Pétain's government had to find a new
base. After some deliberation, the small spa town of Vichy was chosen.
Vichy was ideal as it was close to the border of both the Occupied and
Unoccupied zones over which the French government had, in theory at least,
sovereignty. Moreover, Vichy's popularity as a holiday resort meant that
it had a large number of hotels that provided suitable accommodation for
the new government and its retinue of administrators. Later in the war,
Vichy's position as a small town in the heart of France would be used for
propaganda purposes.
The Dissolution of the Third Republic
Scarcely had the new French government been formed than plans were made to dissolve it, and with it France's tradition of parliamentary democracy. The dislike of parliamentary democracy in general, and of the Third Republic (1870-1940) in particular, was common to influential figures in the cabinet like Weygrand, Alibert and, of course, Pétain himself. Another equally important force for a change to a more autocratic political régime was Pierre Laval. Laval was a former socialist with a formidable reputation for tough negotiating skills. Although he was distrusted by many members of Pétain's cabinet he had, by 23 June 1940, managed to secure himself a prominent position in it as Deputy Prime Minister. Laval was convinced that a more authoritarian government was required to negotiate effectively with Nazi Germany. In a series of meetings, Laval was highly effective in convincing French députés and senators that only a government with an authoritarian constitution and a strong and unopposed leadership could secure France's freedom and the safety of its population. The parliamentary system brought the risk of divisions that could prove costly to a France that needed to show a united front to a formidable power like Nazi Germany.
On the 10 July 1940 Laval summoned all the députés of the two chambers to formally approve the dissolution of the Third Republic and ratify the new French state. Of the 649 députés present at the meeting, 569 voted yes to Pétain being given full executive and legislative powers without restriction. 80 voted against and there were 17 abstentions. On the 12 July 1940, the Third Republic officially came to an end and the French state - l'État français was born with Maréchal Philippe Pétain as its head. The small spa town of Vichy would never again be remembered as a pleasant holiday destination but, rather, as the home of a shameful political régime.
A huge majority of France's elected députés had voted for a radical change to the country's constitution. The new régime they voted in would be monocratic, i.e. power would be invested in a single individual. Power, henceforth, was to emanate not from the people but from the person of the Maréchal himself. The office of President was abolished. Coins, postage stamps and banknotes would carry the words État français and a profile of Pétain. New laws would begin with the declaration Nous, Philippe Pétain, Maréchal de France (We, Philippe Pétain, Marshall of France), a formula that recalled those of absolute monarchies like that of Louis XIV. Pétain had the full authority to nominate ministers, appoint all government officials, introduce new legislation, grant pardons and amnesties, command the armed forces and negotiate with other states. For the first time since the Revolution of 1789, France had no national representative body. Pétain even designated a successor or Dauphin in Pierre Laval.
Although Pétain's powers were virtually limitless, the policies of Vichy were far from being the work of Pétain alone. He surrounded himself with an entourage of advisors who assisted him on policy matters and on speeches. Many of these advisors came from his personal circle of friends with few outsiders. Moreover, many other important legislative decisions were taken, not by Pétain alone, but by his ministers, men like Darlan, Alibert and Weygrand. Other administrative matters were the province of the cabinet which met at regular intervals. The policies of Vichy and of the National Revolution were inevitably inflected with the personalities of Pétain's advisors and ministers and these changed as the war progressed. Indeed, it is difficult to provide a succinct summary of the main influences on Pétain as the composition of his cabinet was constantly changing, with different figures enjoying influence over Pétain at different points in the war.
However, some generalizations are possible. Most of Pétain's cabinet, for example, came from the old government he had led between 16 June and 12 July 1940. They were therefore mostly Right-wing military figures (e.g. General Weygrand, General Huntziger, Admiral Darlan) or pro-Catholic reactionaries (e.g. Philippe Henriot, General de la Porte du Theil). However, Pétain also included a few liberals (Pierre Étienne Flandrin and Joseph Barthélemy) as well as a high-ranking union official from the Confédération Générale du Travail (René Belin) who he made Minister of Industrial Production and Labour. In 1941, when Laval's influence was temporarily eclipsed by that of Admiral Darlan, Vichy became more technocratic. Dalan appointed more and more `experts', like Pierre Pucheu (Minister for Industry), to ensure the efficient running of the state. Pétain tended not to appoint those with a history of political office during the 1920s and 1930s, although, of course, Pierre Laval was a notable exception. As the war went on, Pétain's power to appoint his own ministers found itself limited by demands from Nazi Germany. Moreover, Pétain constantly found himself struggling to improve Franco-German relations which, by 1942, were deteriorating. In 1942 Pétain recalled Laval, who was favoured by the Nazis, and from that moment on lost much of his own authority and power.
Many historians of Vichy agree that there are a number of decisive moments in the political evolution of the Vichy régime:
The first two years of Vichy are, many historians argue, the years of the
National Revolution. As early as 1940 Pétain and his entourage of advisors
and ministers set about an ambitious programme that would return France to
her former glories. The political context - the military defeat of France
and the collapse of government - had created a need for make change with
disasterous policies of the pre-war years. It could be argued that the
National Revolution was not a French fascism but a genuine attempt to
create a new France along socially conservative lines.
France's military defeat and the collapse of government was exploited by
Pétain and his allies to construct a new France. Using his full
legislative and executive powers, the National Revolution - was launched
that would undo the work of the Third Republic and challenge France's
evolution since the Revolution of 1789. Pétain himself disliked the term
`revolution' and preferred instead the phrase `renovation
nationale') - `national renovation'. The Republican triptych of
Liberté, Égalité, Fraternité - a key symbol of France's
Revolutionary and Republican heritage - was replaced by the more
conservative Travail, Famille, Patrie (Work, Family, Fatherland).
The countryside, the family and Catholicism were at the heart of Vichy's
version of French national identity. Vichy perceived this identity as
under threat by the urban proletariat - whose influence had created le
Front populaire, the Popular Front - and which was composed of
undesirable foreigners. The French economy it should be remembered,
suffered due to France's low birth rate, and was greatly assisted by the
large numbers of migrants from Italy and Spain, as well as other countries
from eastern and central Europe, and who had settled in France's major
cities. Vichy's location - in the centre of France and in the middle of
countryside - was exploited in its propaganda. It was towns like Vichy
that expressed the real spirit of France, not cities like Paris.
They constructed a quasi-mystical idea of France and encouraged the French
to return to the countryside, the mythical home of all true French men and
women. Retournez à la terre (Return to the land) was, in fact, the
slogan of one influential propaganda poster. Pétain and his advisors even
dreamt of replacing France's administrative areas or départements
with the historic provinces of the Middle Ages. A link would thus be
forged between France's glorious past and its present. Democratically
elected local officials were be replaced by local businessmen and
landowners. Pétain viewed these regional notables as the natural
defenders of his conservative and rural vision of France.
Linked to Vichy's conservative social agenda, was a stress on the
importance of youth. Pétain and others argued that France's decline during
the Third Republic was attributable, in part, to a lack of emphasis on
character building in schools. The educational system - which Pétain saw
as riddled with secular and Left-wing teachers - placed too much stress on
intellectual achievement and not enough on developing the moral fibre of
its youth. In a speech made on 1 January 1944, Pétain argued that `ce
qu'il faut à la France, à notre cher pays, ce ne sont pas des
intelligences, mais des caractères' (`what France, our cherished country,
needs is character not intelligence'). The National Revolution placed
greater emphasis on religious instruction - reinstated briefly as a
compulsory subject in January 1941 - and on physical exercise.
Two important initiatives resulted from Vichy's attention to its youth.
One was Les Compagnons de France, a major youth organisation set up
for adolescents with an emphasis on healthy living, outdoor physical
labour and sport, and communal living. Although it might be argued that
Vichy's emphasis on youth underlines certain ideological affinities with
European fascism, especially Nazi Germany's Hitler Youth, others (Larkin:
1988 p.91) have claimed that it was more an attempt to reverse the
educational priorities of the Third Republic. These organisations owed
more to the ideals of civic responsibility of Baden-Powell's boy scouts
than to the Hitler Youth.
Another Vichy initiative was Les Chantiers de la jeunesse
established for young men of draft age. Les Chantiers de la
jeunesse provided an alternative to national service in which young
men underwent a quasi-military induction to communal living, hard work and
the ideals of the National Revolution. From 1943, as Nazi Germany required
more and more foreign labour, Les Chantiers de la jeunesse became
the departure points for French workers compelled to work in German
factories.
Although young French women and girls had no equivalents to either Les
Compagnons de France or Les Chantiers de la jeunesse, Vichy
nonetheless had a specific policy on their character development. Vichy
régime sought to reverse France's decline by raising the birth rate. It
reaffirmed, to that end, conservative gender roles: women were to be
encouraged to stay at home and to have as many babies as possible. Family
allowances were increased in April 1941 and mothers who stayed at home
enjoyed an additional grant. Also in April 1941 a law was inroduced that
made divorce impossible durng the first three years of marriage. Abortion
was, of course, illegal with the death penalty for anyone carrying out
such an illegal act. In July 1943 a laundress was guillotined after being
found guilty of performing twenty-six abortions. The education girls
received was more domestic following changes to the school curriculum
introduced in August 1941.
However, in reality these financial incentives came nowhere near the
amount required to raise a family. Vichy also sought to restrict women's
entry into the labour market. on 11 October a law was introduced limiting
the number of women allowed into the workforce. However, the demands of
the French economy, severely weakened by Nazi occupation and the numbers
of men working in German factories, led to this legislation being
reversed.
Central to Vichy's National Revoluition was not just the construction of
an idealized vision of France - rural, conservative etc. - but also the
construction of an anti-France, that is to say, the identification
of the forces considered to led France astray and contributed to its
degeneration. Pétain was well-known for his antipathy to the values of
the Republic. He had a distaste for politicians and for parliamentary
democracy in general, and reserved particular scorn for intellectuals,
schoolteachers, socialists, communists, and freemasons. He considered them
a debilitating influence on a French nation that he preferred to define in
terms of order, hierarchy and discipline.
Quite apart from these two distinct phases, Vichy became more and more
authoritairian and repressive as the war dragged on and the material
hardship most French people endured - e.g. shortages of food, fuel,
clothing, compulsory STO - turned public opinion against Vichy.
The National Revolution
Further Reading